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1. Introduction
The value of goods and services procured by public authorities in 2015 was worth 127.56 billion Euros
in the UK alone.1Major contracts are awarded through a tendering process that is meant to be competitive.
Competition forces tenderers to keep their prices low, thereby saving money for the taxpayer.
Anti-competitive agreements between tenderers such as bid rigging allow them to act as monopolists,
artificially raising prices that are ultimately paid by consumers (in this case taxpayers) and thus placing
an unnecessary burden on public finances. The ability of local authorities and government departments
to bring private actions for damages for a breach of competition law allows some of this public money to
be recovered and deters other tenderers from engaging in similar practices. Before the recent competition
law Damages Directive 2014/104/EC2 (hereinafter the “new Damages Directive”), contracting authorities
were not in a particularly good position to seek damages for bid rigging.
This article critically analyses whether the new Damages Directive has made it easier for authorities
to successfully recover damages for being overcharged and, if this is not the case, what recommendations
can be made and what alternative compensatory remedies are potentially available. This question has
largely been unexplored to date because academics have focused on the other side of the coin, namely the
damages awarded by the authorities to private bidders for violating public procurement procedures and
fundamental principles of equal treatment.3 It is also an issue of great importance given the value of
procurement contracts across Europe4 and the potential cost to taxpayers resulting from bid-rigging
behaviour.5 The significance of this issue is even more apparent if one takes into account the fact that bid
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1Commission, Public Procurement Indicators 2015, DG GROW G4 - Innovative and e-Procurement, 19 December 2016, available at: https://ec
.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/20679 [Accessed 5 September 2018].
2Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L349/1.
3 S. Arrowsmith, Remedies for Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules (Winteringham: Earlsgate, 1993); S. Treumer and F. Lichère, Enforcement
of the EU Public Procurement Rules (København, Djøf Publishing, 2011); D. Fairgrieve and F. Lichère, Public Procurement Law: Damages as an
Effective Remedy (Oxford: Hart, 2011); H. Schebesta, Damages in EU Public Procurement Law (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016),
p.21.
4According to public procurement indicators, the estimated value of tenders published in Tenders Electronic Daily (“TED”) (including utilities and
defence) was 450.21 billion Euros in 2015. Additionally, every year over 250,000 public authorities in the EU spend around 14 per cent of European
GDP on public contracts for the purchase of services, works and suppliers. See Commission, Public Procurement Indicators 2015, 2016; See also
Commission, Public Procurement, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement_en [Accessed 5 September 2018].
5 It is estimated that the annual direct cost to consumers and other victims of hardcore cartels in the EU, including bidding rings, ranges from
approximately 13 billion Euros (on the most conservative assumptions) to over 37 billion Euros (on the least conservative). Due to bid rigging, the
prices are artificially raised between 6 and 48 per cent above the competitive level, while the prices in a supply chain can be raised by more than 30
per cent without this increase being concomitant with a respective restriction of output. See Commission, Staff Working Article accompanying the
White Article on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2008) 165 final, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content
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rigging leads to higher artificial prices than other anti-competitive activities, such as price fixing and
market sharing.6Bid rigging is a practice whereby firms agree to cooperate over their response to invitations
to tender, while price fixing andmarket sharing are horizontal agreements between independent undertakings
to fix prices and divide markets accordingly, in order to suppress price competition and perpetuate the
isolation of geographical markets.7 In a time of economic crisis in which attempts are made to reduce
public expenditure in any possible way, the promotion of private enforcement of EU competition law by
public authorities in the EU Member States may secure budget savings.8
Moreover, any shortcomings in the enforcement of arts 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (“TFEU”) not only hinder the achievement of competition goals, such as better
allocation of resources, greater economic efficiency, increased innovation and lower prices, but also
negatively influences the functioning of the internal market, which relies on a system of undistorted
competition.9 In addition to these reasons, this topic is closely related to bid rigging cartel behaviour, a
very deliberate breach of the law that involves overpaying taxpayers’ funds—money that could otherwise
be invested in public services, for example. Bid rigging constitutes a criminal offence in Germany and
other countries.10 Indicatively, in Germany the official statistics of the Federal Statistics Office report 297
convictions and 42 suspended prison sentences for bid rigging from 1998 to 2013, whilst the French
Competition Authority issued more than 220 decisions for collusion cases in public procurement resulting
in more than 750 different firms being fined.11 In England, 109 construction firms were found to be engaged
in bid rigging activities in 199 tenders from 2000 to 2006.12 Similarly, in Sweden, some of the biggest
construction companies in the country, such as NCC, Skanska and PEAB were found guilty of forming
a cartel that “enriched itself at the expense of customers, taxpayers and consumers”.13 Bidding rings were
also detected in various other markets, such as the market of installation and maintenance of elevators
and escalators14 as well as the market for heating pipes.15
The likely scale of the problem that EU Member States face when it comes to bid rigging renders
necessary research on the entitlement of procurement authorities to damages in case of collusive tendering.
This is so because it is believed that private enforcement may be not only be a deterrent against this
anti-competitive conduct but also a means of restorative justice that can restore taxpayers’ money.16 This
function of damages claims for bid rigging is apparent in countries like Japan, where the deterrent effect
of private enforcement is significant, as “activist plaintiffs obtain substantial recoveries on behalf of local
/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008SC0404&from=EN [Accessed 5 September 2018]; J.B. Baker, “The Case for Antitrust Enforcement” (2003) 17
Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, 29; Competition andMarkets Authority, Local Authorities and Competition, available at:www.gov.uk/government
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/669668/local_authorities_and_competition_final_report.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018], p.10; I.
Apostolakis, “Antitrust Liability in Cases of Indirect Contacts between Competitors: VM Remonts” (2017) 54 C.M.L.R. 609.
6S. Davies and A. Majumdar, The Development of Targets For Consumer Savings Arising from Competition Policy - Report prepared for the Office
of Fair Trading (OFT), June 2002, file:///C:/Users/Penelope/Downloads/The_development_of_targets_for_consumer_savings_a%20(3).pdf [INVALID
URL], p.3; see also M. Maci, “Bid Rigging in the EU Public-Procurement Markets: Some History and Developments” (2011) 32 E.C.L.R. 406.
7R. Whish and D. Bailey, Competition Law, 7th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.524, 530–531, 536–537.
8M. Botta, “Commission acting as plaintiff in cases of private enforcement of EU competition law: Otis” (2013) 50 C.M.L.R. 1115.
9Commission, Impact Assessment Report - Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules, COM (2013) 404 final, available at: http://ec
.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/impact_assessment_en.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018], p.18.
10Austria is one of these countries. See W.P.J. Wils, “Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?” (2005) 28 World Competition 130.
11F.Wagner-von Papp, “Compliance and individual sanctions in the enforcement of competition law,” in J. Paha (ed.),Competition Law Compliance
Programs-An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cham: Springer, 2016), 155; J. Moore, Cartels Facing Competition in Public Procurement: An Empirical
Analysis, September 2012, available at: http://chaire-eppp.org/files_chaire/moore_2013_-_cartels_facing_competition.pdf [Accessed 5 September
2018].
12OFT, Bid Rigging in the Construction Industry in England, available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402154534/http://www
.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/ca98/decisions/bid_rigging_construction [Accessed 5 September 2018].
13 Swedish Competition Authority, Construction Companies Convicted of Operating an Asphalt Cartel, available at: www.konkurrensverket.se/en
/news/construction-companies-convicted-of-operating-a-asphalt-cartel/ [Accessed 5 September 2018].
14Kone AG v OBB-Infrastructur AG (C-557/12), EU:C:2014:1317; [2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 5.
15 LR AF 1998 A/S (formerly Logstor Ror A/S) v Commission of the European Communities (T-23/99) [2002] E.C.R. II-1705; 5 C.M.L.R. 10.
16A. Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts (Oxford: Hart Publishing
2008), p.19; A. Komninos, “The relationship between public and private enforcement: quod Dei Deo, quod Caesaris Caesari”, in Philip Lowe and Mel
Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2011: Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law: Implications for Courts
and Agencies (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), p.142.
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governments and public entities frequently seek and obtain damages”.17 By contrast, in Europe damages
claims for bid rigging do not yet play a crucial role in deterring anti-competitive activities,18 but this does
not mean that things may not change for the better.19
In light of the attempt to improve the European private damages landscape, i.e. through the newDamages
Directive, this article will firstly discuss the problems that contracting authorities usually face when seeking
damages for bid rigging from colluding undertakings, such as proof of the loss suffered and its amount.
Secondly, it will examine whether the new Damages Directive can overcome some or all of these issues
and whether it brings any advantages over the longstanding damages claims based on tort law. As we will
see after analysing the shortcomings of the new Damages Directive and the challenges arising under it
relating to the incentives and practical obstacles to bringing an action, there has not beenmuch improvement
in the legal reparation of contracting authorities as private litigants since its enactment. For this reason,
this article asks whether any recommendations can be made to address this problem and whether there
can be any alternative to compensatory remedies for contracting authorities.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the reasons why contracting authorities are
reluctant to pursue an action against businesses engaged in bid-rigging practices in public procurement.
These reasons are specific to bid rigging and they differ from the general obstacles to effective compensation
identified in the current “Green andWhite Articles” (see below) providing for damages actions for breach
of the EU antitrust rules. The new Damages Directive is briefly outlined to better understand the obstacles
faced by contracting authorities in seeking effective compensation. Section 3 examines the question of
whether the ability to make claims for damages in case of bid rigging under the new Damages Directive
is worthwhile and practicable, taking into account the fact that this ability already existed in most EU
Member States under the national tort laws. This will be done by outlining and analysing the challenges
that arise under the new Directive regarding private enforcement by procurement entities. In section 4,
recommendations are made in order to deal with some of the hurdles that contracting authorities face when
seeking damages for bid rigging, since the new Damages Directive failed to address them properly. In
section 5, there is a discussion of whether a remedywhich is not based on tortious liability but on contractual
principles could also help contracting authorities to overcome the challenges under the new Damages
Directive regarding their right to claim damages for bid rigging. The cause of action at issue is based on
the experience gained in Germany and the UK. The last section draws together the main conclusions.
2. Why Contracting Authorities Do Not Sue Cartels for Damages
Before analysing the reasons why actions by public authorities to recover damages for bid rigging are
infrequent in the EU, it is necessary to briefly present the legislative background of the new Damages
Directive and refer to the main issues that were identified by the Green and White Article on damages
actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules as obstacles to private enforcement.
On 19 December 2005, the Commission adopted the Green Article which identified the main obstacles
to effective compensation.20 The response to this public consultation was wide and involved several
institutional stakeholders.21As a result, a Report and a Resolution were adopted by the European Parliament
in 2007, which invited the Commission to proceed to a White Article that would make detailed proposals
17 S. Vande Walle, “Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in Japan: An Empirical Analysis” (2011) 8 Comp. L. Rev. 8.
18Commission, Impact Assessment Report - Damages Actions for Breach of the EUAntitrust Rules (2013); OECD Secretariat, Relationship Between
Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement, June 2015, available at: www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP
/WP3(2015)14&docLanguage=En [Accessed 5 September 2018] ; B.J. Rodger, “Competition Law Litigation in the UK Courts: A Study of All Cases
2005-2008- Part I” (2009)2 G.C.L.R. 95, 104.
19M.P. Schinkel, “Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe” (2007) 30 World Competition: Law and Economics Review 556–557.
20Commission, Green Article - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2005)672 final, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu
/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0672&from=EN [Accessed 5 September 2018]. The Green Article was prepared by a 2004 study
on the conditions under which private parties can bring actions for antitrust damages.
21Commission, Impact Assessment Report - Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules (2013), p.6.
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to facilitate actions for damages.22On 2April 2008, theWhite Article23was published including suggestions
for specific measures that would ensure the effective exercise of the right to compensation for antitrust
harm.24 The White Article was accompanied by an Impact Assessment. In these documents, the major
difficulties that victims of competition law infringements usually experience when asking for compensation
were identified. Some of them were:
“The difficult access to the evidence that is necessary for proving a case, lack of clear rules on the
passing-on defence (i.e. a defence against a direct purchaser’s damages claim, relying on evidence
showing that the overcharge resulting from a cartel was passed on-fully or partially- by the direct
purchaser to its own customers further down the distribution chain), the calculation of damages and
the rules concerning the costs of a damages action”.25
The Directive sought to overcome these issues by introducing a number of key provisions. For instance,
regarding access to evidence, it contemplated that courts should ensure enhanced but proportionate access
to evidence held by plaintiffs, defendants and third parties, including antitrust agencies, subject to two
important limitations.26The first one concerns the prohibition of disclosure of corporate statements submitted
to the Commission under the EU’s amnesty regime (i.e. its leniency programme) and the second concerns
the ban on the disclosure of settlement submissions under the EU’s settlement procedure.27 Regarding the
passing-on defence,28 the new Damages Directive made the defence available in response to claims by
either direct29 or indirect30 purchaser claims.31 In case of direct purchaser claims, the burden of proof is on
the defendant whomust prove that every overcharge was passed on by the plaintiffs to their own customers.32
The new Damages Directive also created a rebuttable presumption as to the existence of harm resulting
from a cartel but it did not introduce any presumption as to any particular overcharge percentage.33
Furthermore, it provided for joint and several liability of defendants in cartel cases, except where the
infringer is a successful immunity recipient and a small or medium-sized enterprise (“SME”).34
After briefly highlighting the measures introduced by the new Damages Directive with the aim of
increasing civil antitrust claims, we turn now to the reasons why the level of private enforcement among
contracting authorities is low in relation to bid rigging. Firstly, the entitlement of contracting authorities
to damages under competition law can generate costs in terms of resources involved in litigation and time,
which will ultimately be borne by the public budget to the detriment of taxpayers. This is particularly true
in EU Member States where there are many and small procurement agencies (“high fragmentation of
22Commission, Impact Assessment Report - Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules (2013), p.6.
23Commission, White Article on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008)165 final, http://ec.europa.eu/competition
/antitrust/actionsdamages/impact_assessment_en.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018].
24Commission, Impact Assessment Report - Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules (2013), p.6.
25Commission, Impact Assessment Report - Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules (2013), p.15; Commission, White Article on
Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008), para.2; Schinkel, “Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe” (2007) 30World Competition:
Law and Economics Review 557–558.
26Directive 2014/104, art.6; M. Sansom, A. Morfey and P. Teague, “Recent Developments in Private Antitrust Damages Litigation in Europe”
(2015) 29 Antitrust 33, 36–37.
27Commission, White Article on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008), para.6; Sansom, Morfey and Teague, “Recent
Developments in Private Antitrust Damages Litigation in Europe” (2015) 29 Antitrust 37.
28 I.e. a defence against a claim for damages for which the claimant passed on the whole or part of the overcharge resulting from the infringement
of competition law.
29Direct purchaser means a natural or legal person who acquired, directly from an infringer, products or services that were the object of an infringement
of competition law: Directive 2014/104, art.2(23).
30 Indirect purchaser means a natural or legal person who acquired, not directly from an infringer, but from a direct purchaser or a subsequent
purchaser, products or services that were the object of an infringement of competition law, or products or services containing them or derived therefrom:
Directive 2014/104, art.2(24).
31Directive 2014/104, art.13; Sansom, Morfey and Teague, “Recent Developments in Private Antitrust Damages Litigation in Europe” (2015) 29
Antitrust 37.
32Directive 2014/104, art.13.
33Directive 2014/104, art.17; Sansom, Morfey and Teague, “Recent Developments in Private Antitrust Damages Litigation in Europe” (2015) 29
Antitrust 37.
34Directive 2014/104, art.11.
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public sector”), that lack or do not allocate efficiently enforcement resources. The “loser pays” cost rule
that governs the national tort systems in Europe makes a claim for damages very expensive and risky for
contracting authorities that manage and use the taxpayers’ money, i.e. the State budget.
Whereas private actors usually have a strong motivation and industry-specific knowledge to monitor
and detect anti-competitive behaviour,35 public officers may have difficulty in identifying and
comprehending the length and nature of deviations from the initial quantity ordered and contracted by the
State. This is so because bid rigging is tricky to detect, whilst the public procurement community is not
always equipped with tools to prevent, detect and deter bid rigging, as successfully happens in the UK
for instance, where the Competition Market Authority (“CMA”) has developed tools and advice to help
purchasers within the public sector identify suspicious behaviour by suppliers when bidding for contracts.36
Public officers are also under constant pressure to ensure maximum value for taxpayers’ money, whilst
having to take numerous considerations—legal, environmental and social—into account. This means that
sometimes theymay pay little attention to whether bidding rings exist or not, without constantly monitoring
bidding activities and without performing analyses on bid data in order to collect historical information
on bidding behaviour. This makes sense if it is also considered that the performance of public officers is
generally not assessed on the basis of the number of bidding rings discovered but on how they set up and
ran the bidding processes successfully to meet public needs without delay.37 In addition to the above, when
it comes to bid rigging, there are many EUMember States, such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary
and Romania which, as a matter of policy, promote more individual sanctions, like criminal penalties38 as
opposed to sanctions operating at the corporate level, like civil damages claims. Another reason could be
that only a few cases have recently been brought by public contracting authorities in the courts of Member
States for damages resulting from bid rigging, giving a false impression that bid rigging is less of a problem
in the EU.39 According to a 2007 study, the antitrust infringement that is most frequently challenged
through private litigation in the EU is vertical restraints ,40 and only 12 cases out of 96 involved hardcore
cartels, including bid rigging schemes.41 Nevertheless, in Netherlands after the revelation of bidding rings
in the construction sector, the government reached a global settlement with the construction industry,
recovering 70 million Euros in damages for bid rigging.42
One of the few cases brought for damages resulting from bid rigging in the EU is European Commission
v Otis NV, which preceded the new Damages Directive.43 In this case, the EU represented by the
Commission, asked for damages for the higher price it allegedly paid for the maintenance of elevators in
European institution buildings in Belgium and Luxembourg, as a result of the anti-competitive practices
established in the decision of 21 February 2007. According to the Commission’s decision in 2007, the
35R. Preston McAfee, H.M. Mialon and S.H. Mialon, “Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis” (2008) 92 Journal of Public
Economics 1866–1867; Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation on Options for Reform -
Government Response, January 2013, available at:www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70185/13-501-private-actions
-in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform-government-response1.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018], pp.8, 11; A. Renda, J. Peysner,
A.J. Riley and B.J. Rodger, Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios - Final Report,
2007, p.18.
36The CMA Screening for Cartels tool is freely available for procurement professionals to download and use. It is a software that uses algorithms
to spot unusual bidder behaviour and pricing patterns which may indicate that bid rigging has taken place. For further information, see: www.gov.uk
/government/news/cma-launches-digital-tool-to-fight-bid-rigging [Accessed 5 September 2018].
37Alberto Heimler, “Cartels in Public Procurement” (2012) 8(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 861.
38Wagner-von Papp, “Compliance and Individual Sanctions in the Enforcement of Competition Law” (2016).
39 S. Vande Walle, Private Antitrust Litigation in the European Union and Japan: A Comparative Perspective (Antwerp: Maklu Publishers, 2013),
p.227.
40Vertical restraints are agreements or concerted practices between two or more undertakings operating at a different level of the production or
distribution chain, that may affect trade between Member States and that prevent, restrict or distort competition. For further information, please see
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C130/1.
41Renda, Peysner, Riley and Rodger,Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios - Final
Report (2007), p.40.
42 S. Vande Walle, Private Antitrust Litigation in the European Union and Japan: A Comparative Perspective, (Antwerp: Maklu Publishers 2013),
p.232.
43European Commission v Otis NV (C-199/11), EU:C:2012:684; 4 [2013] C.M.L.R. 4.
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elevator manufacturers were found guilty of infringement of art.101 TFEU from 1996 to 2004, as they
were involved in market sharing and bid rigging with regard to the installation andmaintenance of elevators
and escalators in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Shortly thereafter, the Commission
fined the relevant elevator manufacturers 992 million Euros.
Despite this decision, the Court dismissed the Commission’s claim for damages in respect of the harm
caused by the elevators and escalators cartels. Since the new Directive was not applicable when the action
for damages was lodged and so the rebuttable presumption under art.17(2) did not yet apply, it was held
that the Commission did not submit direct evidence or oral evidence of witnesses that could determine or
estimate the damages caused by the cartel arrangements.44 In other words, before the enactment of the new
Damages Directive, it could not be assumed that practices such as bid rigging automatically led to higher
prices.
As already highlighted above, the introduction of the newDamages Directive has arguably not improved
the position. The fact that cartels are presumed to cause harm does not mean that the (exact amount of
the) cartel overcharge is automatically proved nor the loss suffered by the claimant. The financial harm
still needs to be specified and quantified and currently the burden of proof is on the claimant. This is an
additional reason why contracting authorities are not particularly well-placed to pursue an action for
damages against cartels.
3. Evaluation of the NewDirective’s Effectiveness in Fostering Actions for Damages
As indicated, there were a number of reasons why the level of private enforcement for bid rigging has
been historically low. With the aim of improving the position of government procurement authorities as
private litigants in competition cases, para.(3) in the Preamble of the new Damages Directive was
introduced. According to the Preamble, in addition to consumers and undertakings, public authorities (and
so procurement entities) can also claim compensation before national courts for the harm caused to them
by an infringement of arts 101 and 102 TFEU. This right already existed in most EU Member States and
so the new Damages Directive expressly confirms that arts 101 and 102 TFEU create obligations and
rights for contracting authorities that national courts must enforce. Competition damages for bid rigging
in public procurement will enable contracting authorities to get compensated for losses unjustly suffered.
Under the legal regime of the new Damages Directive, a pivotal question arises as to whether the new
Damages Directive is effective for the legal reparation of contracting authorities as private litigants, and
whether this will bring any advantages over the longstanding damages claims based on tort law. In order
to answer this question, there is need to take into account the shortcomings and challenges arising under
the Directive.
First, the new Damages Directive does not provide for specific aspects of antitrust litigation, such as
legal costs and cost shifting (loser pays), which are determinant factors of whether the harmed contracting
authorities will commence a legal action or not,45 as procurement entities manage and spend public money
and so it is the citizens that will eventually bear any financial loss and litigation cost by contributing to
the state budget as taxpayers.46 For contracting authorities in their capacity as claimants, the size and
predictability of litigation costs can determine whether they will access justice or not because if the costs
are too high, there may be no benefit for them to pursue a legal action.47 In almost all countries, cost
44 J. Ramos and D. Muhume, “The Brussels Court judgement in Commission v Elevators manufacturers, or the story of how the Commission lost
an action for damages based on its own infringement decision” (2015) 36 E.C.L.R. 386.
45M. De Sousa e Alvim, “The new Directive on antitrust damages - a giant step forward? (2015) 36 ECLR, p.247; S. Peyer, Compensation and the
Damages Directive” (2016) 12 E.C.J. 87–112; S. Peyer, “The Antitrust Damages Directive – Much Ado About Nothing?”, in Cisotta and Marquis
(eds), Litigation and Arbitration in EU Competition Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar ,2015).
46M. Maci, “Private Enforcement in Bid Rigging Cases in the European Union” (2012) 8 (I) E.C.J. 216.
47C. Hodges, S. Vogenauer and M. Tulibacka, “The Oxford Study on Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation - Introduction”, in Hodges, Vogenauer
and Tulibacka (eds), The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Perspective (Bloomsbury Publishing 2010), p.4.
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shifting (loser pays) is the general rule, apart from Lithuania and the USA, where each party undertakes
its own costs.48 By not following the example of Lithuania and the USA, the new Damages Directive has
lost the chance to overcome the funding barriers that claimants usually face when it comes to bring damages
for anti-competitive practices, depending in this way on the discretionary power of each court to award
or not reasonable costs instead of full legal costs. It was suggested that such important elements of the
private enforcement of competition law were left out of the Directive’s scope on purpose; otherwise the
new Damages Directive would not be accepted. The loser pays rule is too engrained in European legal
tradition.49
Secondly, the new Damages Directive has not dealt with the key procedural hurdles that a contracting
authority may face when bringing a damages claim for bid rigging, such as the evidence of a causal link
and the quantification of the financial harm suffered by contracting authorities as a result of overcharged
products or services in the context of the public procurement procedure. The Directive has been “reticent
to engage in an extensive harmonization of the causation requirement”, by insisting on reliance on the
various tort law systems of EU Member States, under the framework of the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness.50 The CJEU has also not clarified the issue.51 Though the newDamages Directive proceeded
to include a number of provisions that make the evidence of a causal link much easier, practically speaking,
these steps are not adequate to boost the number of damage actions initiated by public contracting
authorities. Despite the explicit rule of joint and several liability in art.11, nothing is really gained by this
rule. When it comes to bid rigging, it is much harder in terms of evidence to establish which undertakings
were participants in the bidding ring and which undertakings were outsiders. This is so because there is
not any typical illegal behaviour that would enable a simple establishment of who is in the bidding ring
and who is not, as may happen in normal cartels, where one of the ways to determine cartel membership
is to look at the level of output that a firm produces before and after the alleged cartel formation. Moreover,
the lack of familiarity of procurement officers with bidding patterns related to bid rigging makes it even
harder for them to assess whether or not a specific tender presents a bid pattern that raises concerns and
constitutes prima facie evidence of bid rigging that needs formal antitrust investigation.52 So, the extra
difficulty of identifying the members of the bidding ring as well as the fact that procurement agencies
lack skills and experience necessary to identify prima facie evidence of bid rigging and to apply the
economic theories of collusion means that inevitably the private enforcement will be little in the domain
of public procurement. Yet, some jurisdictions have gotten off to a good start by enabling their national
competition authorities to control the competitiveness of public procurement and initiate a bid rigging
case on their own initiative every time they suspect infringement of competition law in the course of a
public tender.53
The same applies to the reversal of the burden of proof on the infringer/defendant, in case it invokes
as a defence against a claim for damages the fact that the injured party/claimant has already reduced its
actual loss by passing it on, entirely or partly, to its own purchasers.54 It is not usual at all in the context
of public procurement to see public authorities selling on the goods that they procure and do so for a profit.
Again, it is neither common nor usual at all to see indirect purchasers in the context of public procurement,
48C. Hodges, S. Vogenauer and M. Tulibacka, “The Oxford Study on Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation - National approaches to costs and
funding of civil litigation”, in C. Hodges, S. Vogenauer and M. Tulibacka (eds), The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Perspective
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), p.17.
49Editorial Comments, “One bird in the hand…The Directive on Damages Actions for Breach of the Competition Rules” (2014) 51 C.M.L.R. 1342.
50 I. Lianos, “Causal Uncertainty and Damages Claims for the Infringement of Competition Law in Europe” (2015) 1 Yearbook of European Law
50.
51 F.G. Wilman, “The End of the Absence? The Growing Body of EU Legislation on Private Enforcement and the Main Remedies It Provides For”
(2016) 53 C.M.L.R. 902.
52 International Competition Network, Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual- Chapter on Relationships between Competition Agencies and Public
Procurement Bodies, April 2015, available at: http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1036.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018].
53 International Competition Network, Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual- Chapter on Relationships between Competition Agencies and Public
Procurement Bodies (2015).
54Directive 2014/104, Recital 39.
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namely natural or legal persons who acquired from a government department or local authority products
or services that were the object of bid rigging or derived therefrom. Thus, the presumption of causality
for the benefit of indirect purchasers because they “did not themselves make any purchase from the
infringer (i.e. bid riggers in our case) to prove the scope of that harm”55 does not have practical relevance
in case of contracting authorities suing cartels for damages in the context of the public procurement process.
At this point, it would be worth mentioning that the passing-on defence is not accepted in the USA in line
with the Illinois Brick case.56 However, there are some exceptions to the exclusion of indirect purchaser
claims provided for in US Federal law and cost-plus pricing57 is one of them.58
Even the causal presumption for cartels that the new Damages Directive expressly sets in order to
“remedy the information asymmetry and some of the difficulties associated with quantifying antitrust
harm, as well as to ensure the effectiveness of claims for damages”,59 is not enough for contracting
authorities to be incentivised to sue bid riggers for damages. To be more specific, according to art.17 of
the new Damages Directive, it shall be presumed that cartel infringements cause harm and the infringer
shall have the right to rebut that presumption. Yet, the existence of an infringement decision does not
prove itself the level of harm incurred by the overcharge.60 Contracting authorities must still predict the
real prices of the supplies or services had bid riggers not raised them artificially, by estimating what the
winning bids would have been but for the collusive agreement (the counterfactual).61 This is something
particularly demanding and costly, especially in view of the “blanket ban” imposed on the disclosure of
files and documents submitted by the firm that first blew the whistle on the bid-rigging conspiracy62 as
well as the difficulty of procurement officers in identifying and comprehending the length and nature of
deviations from the initial quantity ordered and contracted by the State for the reasons discussed in section
2. The demonstration and calculation of the cartel overcharge by contracting authorities becomes even
more difficult in cases in which there is need to take into account environmental, social and innovative
aspects when assessing a tender on the basis of the best price-quality ratio. By procuring in a more quality
oriented way, contracting authorities are called to determine each time the overcharge not only on the
basis of price and life-cycle costs but also quality, environmental considerations, social aspects or innovation
of what is procured.
Of course the newDamages Directive contemplates that when it is practically impossible or excessively
difficult for a claimant precisely to quantify the harm suffered on the basis of the evidence available, the
national courts shall be empowered to estimate the amount of harm.63However, the calculation of damages
is one of the most complex issues in private competition law claims. In addition, the damage estimation
exercise may be rather challenging for contracting authorities for another reason. Bid riggers take great
care not to get detected and so direct proof of the amount of the overcharge is not usually available in the
context of public procurement.64 This is compounded by the fact that the application of the leniency
55Directive 2014/104, Recital 36 and art.14(2).
56 Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977).
57Cost plus contracts do not specify a price, like in case of a fixed price contract, where the seller receives a lump sum payment irrespective of the
costs actually incurred, but they reimburse the contract or for costs. This reduces the adversarial relationship that may arise between the seller and the
buyer if the completion of the contract entails additional work above the originally described, and for this reason cost plus contracts are generally
preferred in the construction industry. For further information, please see Patrick Bajari and Steven Tadelis, Procurement Contracts: Fixed Price vs.
Cost Plus, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=156470 [Accessed 5 September 2018].
58 In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012); Commission, Study on the Passing-On of Overcharges - Final Report 2016,
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/KD0216916ENN.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018], pp.18–20; Herbert Hovenkamp,
“The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales” (1990) 103(7) Harvard Law Review 1717–1731.
59Directive 2014/104, Recital 42 and art.17(2).
60A. Stephan, “The EU Damages Directive”, in D. Geradin, A. Stephan and C. Argenton (eds), EU Cartel Law and Economics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018) forthcoming.
61 J.H. Howard and D. Kaserman, “Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases” (1989) 34 Antitrust Bulletin 363–364; S. Bishop
and M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), Ch.17.
62Directive 2014/104, art.6(6); J. Kwan-Terry, “The Damages Directive: end of England’s eminence?” (2015) 36 E.C.L.R. 459.
63Directive 2014/104, art.17(1).
64Howard and Kaserman, “Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases” (1989) 34 Antitrust Bulletin 363–364; Bishop and
Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (2010), pp.363–364.
242 Public Procurement Law Review
(2018) 27 P.P.L.R., Issue 6 © 2018 Thomson Reuters and Contributors
programme for the detection of bid rigging in public procurement is not widespread, in contrast to normal
cartels where leniency applicants are the most frequent source of information.65 As a consequence, the
difficulty, time and administrative cost of collecting intelligence and evidence of cartel infringements still
remains in public procurement, whilst the leniency programme could have been a significant help for
public officers.
The first reason for this is the great stability of cartels in public procurement markets. It is a disincentive
for colluding firms to report the existence of a bidding ring when it does not seem to break up immediately.66
The second reason relates to the fact that many cartels are usually reported in the context of a merger
between two firms, as soon as the acquiring firm discovers the anti-competitive conduct of the acquired
firm. In case of public procurement, the size of bid rigging companies is usually small and so a merger
between them does not fall under the turnover threshold to trigger a merger notification under the EU
law.67 Moreover, the reputational damage that can be politically adverse in the next procurement process
is another disincentive for firms involved in a bidding ring, when it comes to apply for leniency.68 The
ineffectiveness of leniency policies when it comes to bid rigging has also been empirically proved by an
experimental study that took place in a repeated procurement auction game.69 But even if direct proof of
the overcharge amount is available, it will probably be an “understated measure of damage”.70
Further, there may be difficulty in deciding which contracts to include in the sample under investigation
in order to classify them as rigged or unrigged.71As already explained above, when it comes to bid rigging,
there is not a typical illegal behaviour that gives an indication of which undertakings were participants in
the bidding ring and which undertakings were outsiders, thus enabling contracting authorities to collect
evidence and make the relevant classifications. This is particularly true in the case of industries where
there has been evidence of “endemic” bid rigging in respect of thousands of tenders, such as the construction
sector in England and Scotland, in which, according to one study, 112 companies were found to be engaged
in bid rigging.72 If this problem is not properly addressed, the statistical analysis of damages may be
“seriously biased downward”, by indicating lower damages than were actually suffered by the victims.73
An additional problemmay be the identification of an adequate control group so that comparator-based
methods may be used in order to estimate over time on the same market the price difference between the
real value of the products or services and the artificially raised price at which they were purchased by the
contracting authorities.74 This means that a reliable statistical evaluation presupposes a sufficient number
of unrigged observations in order to compare the price in the infringement scenario with a non-infringement
scenario.75 However, it may be rather difficult to collect data on public contracts awarded before the
formation of a bidding ring and after its detection, either because of the time that has passed or because
65Heimler, “Cartels in Public Procurement” (2012) 8(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 857. See also Wils, “The Use of Leniency in
EU Cartel Enforcement: An Assessment after Twenty Years” (2016) 39(3) World Competition 327–388.
66Heimler, “Cartels in Public Procurement” (2012) 8(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 859.
67Heimler, “Cartels in Public Procurement” (2012) 8(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 859.
68Heimler, “Cartels in Public Procurement” (2012) 8(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 10–12; ICN, Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual:
Relationships between Competition Agencies and Public Procurement Bodies, April 2015, available at: www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org
/uploads/library/doc1036.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018].
69Y. Hamaguchi and T. Kawagoe, An Experimental Study of Procurement Auctions with Leniency Program, CPRC Discussion Article Series
CPDP-24-E, January 2007, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237664384_An_Experimental_Study_of_Procurement_Auctions
_with_Leniency_Programs [Accessed 5 September 2018]; C. Marvāo and G. Spagnolo, “What do we know about the effectiveness of leniency policies?
A survey of the empirical and experimental evidence”, in Caron Beaton-Wells and Christopher Tran (eds), Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary
Age - Leniency Religion (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), pp.77–78.
70Howard and Kaserman, Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases (1989) 34 Antitrust Bulletin 363–364; Bishop and Walker,
The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (2010), pp.363–364.
71Howard and Kaserman, “Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases” (1989) 34 Antitrust Bulletin 365.
72M. Tournier and J. Pheasant, “The UK Construction Industry Under the Spotlight Again” (2008) 29 E.C.L.R. 557–559.
73Howard and Kaserman, “Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases” (1989) 34 Antitrust Bulletin 365.
74Howard and Kaserman, “Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases” (1989) 34 Antitrust Bulletin 365–366.
75Commission, Practical Guide Quantifying Harm in Actions For Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union, SWD (2013) 205, available at:www.ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_guide_en.pdf [Accessed
5 September 2018], pp.15–19.
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the damages action was brought so promptly that not many public contracts could be concluded in the
aftermath.76 Particularly in the domain of public procurement, where the fragmentation of the public sector
is extremely high, there is an enormous volume of data which is fragmented in computerised systems
from different contracting authorities. As a result, the collection of data on public contracts awarded before
the formation and after the detection of a bidding ring becomes even more difficult. What is more, as
already mentioned in the previous paragraph, in industries where bid rigging turns out to be “endemic”,
it is rather hard to ensure a sufficient number of unrigged observations.
In addition to the above weaknesses and challenges that the new Directive presents, there is empirical
research suggesting that there would be no point in promoting private enforcement actions involving
bidding rings. This is so because of the limited role that private antitrust litigation plays in most European
jurisdictions regarding the deterrence of anti-competitive violations and the compensation of consumers
and undertakings suffering from those violations.77 Additionally, settlements are prevalent in EUMember
States. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) only a
few victims of antitrust infringement have been indemnified, as from 2006 to 2012 “less than 25 per cent
of the European Commission’s infringement decisions were followed by damages actions”.78 The European
Commission clearly stated in para.52 of its Impact Assessment Report on damages actions for breach of
the EU antitrust rules that:
“Out of the 54 final cartel and antitrust prohibition decisions taken by the Commission in the period
2006-2012, only 15 were followed by one or more follow-on actions for damages in one or more
Member States. In total, 52 actions for damages were brought in only seven Member States. In the
20 other Member States, the Commission is not aware of any follow-on action for damages based
on a Commission decision”.79
Though it is not clear whether the above statistics include public bodies that sue for bid rigging, it is likely
that the same applies because settlements are also favoured in the domain of public procurement. Public
authorities are usually in a strong position to encourage bidders to settle claims for damages instead of
going to court, as the undertakings know well that they will have to bid for future public contracts from
the former. At the same time, contracting authorities take great care not to spoil cooperative relationships
with future partners and so they may be content with partial instead of full compensation, since a settlement
would be better for them than nothing. The overall prevalence of settlement activity in public procurement
can also be supported by the new Damages Directive, which contemplates in Recital (48) that: “infringers
and injured parties should be encouraged to agree on compensating for the harm caused by a competition
law infringement through consensual dispute resolution mechanisms, such as out-of-court settlements,
arbitration, mediation or conciliation”. Thus, “an infringer that pays damages through consensual dispute
resolution should not be placed in a worse position vis-à-vis its co-infringers than it would otherwise be
without the consensual settlement”.80 Moreover, compensation paid as a result of consensual settlement
76Howard and Kaserman, Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases (1989) 34 Antitrust Bulletin 365–366.
77According to the Ashurst study that took place in 2014, almost 104 damages actions were identified for the whole of the EU. Another report which
was prepared for the European Commission found only 96 antitrust damages actions between May 2004 and the third quarter of 2007. From these
antitrust actions, 61 concerned horizontal agreements, concerted practices or naked cartels (12 on hardcore cartels or concerted practices, 1 on horizontal
agreements); and 22 cases involved abuses of dominance. The aforementioned damages actions were observed only in 10 of the 27 Member States.
Moreover, research from the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) in the UK surveyed 202 companies about their views on private actions under competition
law. Although 45 of them thought that their company had been harmed by a breach of competition law by someone else, only five companies finally
decided to bring an action because the expected costs would outweigh the benefits. SeeD. Waelbroeck, D. Slater and G. Even-Shoshan, Study on the
Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules, Comparative Report, 31 August 2004, available at: http://ec
.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018]; Renda, Peysner, Riley and Rodger,
Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios - Final Report (2007); Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills, Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation on Options for Reform, April 2012, available at: www.gov.uk/government
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31528/12-742-private-actions-in-competition-law-consultation.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018].
78OECD Secretariat, Relationship Between Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement (2015), p.5.
79Commission, Impact Assessment Report - Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules (2013).
80Directive 2014/104, Recital 51.
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and prior to the imposition of a fine, may be a mitigating factor taken into account by the relevant
competition authority.81
It must be acknowledged that the new Damages Directive did not have as one of its express objectives
the improvement of contracting authorities’ ability to bring damages actions in the context of public
procurement. However, in view of the above discussion and analysis, it could be said that, whilst public
procurement authorities can bring damages actions, the new Damages Directive does not provide a
framework for encouraging contracting authorities to use private enforcement and for this reason its
practical relevance in the area of public procurement seems limited.
Hence, it seems that the newDamages Directive does not provide any advantages over claims according
to long-standing national tort laws and the general competition law when it comes to public authorities
in public procurement. This conclusion is also supported by several recent empirical surveys which affirm
that it would not be appropriate to promote damages claims for bid rigging, in view of their limited role
in deterring antitrust violations in most European jurisdictions and the prevalence of settlement activity.
4. Recommendations
In the absence of provisions under the new Directive that may have some practical relevance for the
contracting authorities in the area of public procurement, it is time to make some recommendations that
would make it easier for public authorities to seek damages for bid rigging. The first recommendation
regards the high litigation costs that public authorities usually face when claiming damages for bid rigging.
A possible suggestion to deal with this issue is to form a “Competition Damages Litigation Fund”, i.e. a
supply of money collected from contracting authorities, with the aim to use it for covering the competition
damages litigation costs. A Competition Damages Litigation Fund would permit the collection and saving
of money for this specific reason, every time the national courts of a particular EU Member State award
damages to the relevant contracting authorities for the anti-competitive activities of economic operators
in the context of public procurement. Though it could be counter-argued that it is sufficient for every
contracting authority to collect its own damages awarded by the national courts, without having to establish
a separate Competition Damages Litigation Fund, a single account for competition damages litigation is
an essential tool for consolidating and managing procurement entities’ cash resources. In EU Member
States with a highly fragmented public sector the establishment of a Competition Damages Litigation
Fund would enable aggregate and efficient control and monitoring of the damages awarded to various
contracting authorities, while it would prevent idle balances maintained in several bank accounts. At the
same time, it would facilitate reconciliation between banking and accounting data and it would prove that
as a matter of fact damages claims for bid rigging in public procurement is a priority in the public agenda.
The management of this fund could be left to the Auditor General of every EU Member State, who
will be in charge of calculating and paying the arising litigation costs as well as of informing regularly
the contracting authorities about the balance of the account. Something similar already happens in the
UK, where the Accountant General of the Senior Courts is responsible for the control of the money paid
into courts.82Additionally, in the UK there is a Court Funds Office which provides banking and investment
services by accounting for any money being paid into and out of court and by looking after any investments
made with that money.83 Similarly, when the residual funds of the Competition Damages Litigation Fund
are beyond a specific and predetermined amount of money at the end of each year, the Auditor General
of every EU Member State may distribute them pro rata to the involved contracting authorities in order
81Directive 2014/104, art.18(3).
82The National Archives, Court of Chancery: Office of the Accountant General, Supreme Court Pay Office: Indexes to Accounts, available at: http:
//discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C18421 [Accessed 5 September 2018]; UKGovernment, PayMoney into the Court Funds Office, available
at: www.gov.uk/pay-court-funds-office [Accessed 5 September 2018].
83UK Government, Pay Money into the Court Funds Office.
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to apply them for their indirect benefit, such as purchase of new furniture for their premises, organisation
and conduct of a new procurement process etc. The fact that part of this money may remain in the
administration will also be an extra incentive for public officers to become more interested in discovering
bidding rings and in claiming damages for bid rigging. Another recommendation could also be to restrict
the compensation of the defendant’s fees to the statutory attorney fees in order to prevent situations of
abuse on behalf of the defendant. Germany is an illustrative example of this, despite the “loser pays” rule
that applies there.84
Regarding the concern of contracting authorities that the initiation of litigation against colluding
economic operators may spoil their cooperative relationship, the author would suggest the assignment of
their claims to a third party that would also have an interest in bringing an action. It has been suggested
that special courts/institutions, like audit agencies, procurement oversight agencies, like the National
Anti-Corruption Authority of Italy, as well as private agents, like law firms and taxpayer associations
could be identified as having a proper incentive to sue as a third party.85 This is something that already
takes place in Germany, where claimants can assign their claim to third party funders or special purpose
vehicles (SPVs).86 In the above list of third parties with a proper incentive to sue, the competitors of the
bid riggers that were not selected for the award of the public contract due to the manipulation of the bidding
process could also be included.
As far as the contracting authorities’ difficulty in specifying and quantifying the financial harm is
concerned, the introduction of statutory or pre-established damagesmight be a good solution to the problem.
Specifically, it is suggested that contracting authorities before the final judgment should have the option
to ask for the recovery of statutory/pre-established damages instead of actual damages, namely a lump
sum calculated by the national courts on the basis of pre-determined factors. These factors could mutually
be agreed by the litigants before the initiation of the legal proceedings and they could indicatively be the
tenders submitted by “maverick bidders”, i.e. firms that have demonstrated aggressivity in the past, an
aggressive reserve price or at least the cost of the entire procurement process, “from the identification of
procurement opportunities, through the preparation of relevant documentation (an invitation to tender/offer)
and the conduct of the whole procurement procedure, to provision for possible complaints and litigation”.87
Such an evidence-facilitating device already applies in the domain of intellectual property, where judicial
authorities are enabled “in appropriate cases” to set the damages as a lump sum on the basis of elements
such as at least the amount of royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested
authorisation to use the intellectual property right in question.88 Similarly, statutory damages can be found
in copyright cases after the enactment of the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Act of
1999 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.89
84A. Bach and C. Wolf, Germany: Private Antitrust Litigation, 2016, available at: www.globalcompetitionreview.com/chapter/1067842/germany
-private-antitrust-litigation [Accessed 5 September 2018].
85G. Spagnolo, Public Procurement, Bid Rigging and (the Lack of) Actions for Damages, Lear Conference on Public Procurement and Competition
Policy, Rome, 3–5 July 2017, available at: www.learconference.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/SPAGNOLO_Damages_Lear_2017.pdf [Accessed
5 September 2018].
86Bach and Wolf, Germany: Private Antitrust Litigation (2016).
87For further information about how to analyse costs of the procurement process, see PwC, London Economics and Ecorys, Public Procurement in
Europe - Cost and Effectiveness- A Study on Procurement Regulation prepared for the European Commission, March 2011, available at: https://ukmin
.lrv.lt/uploads/ukmin/documents/files/Studija%20d%C4%97l%20kainos%20ir%20efektyvumo%20vie%C5%A1uosiuose%20pirkimuose.pdf [Accessed
5 September 2018].
88Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ
L195, art.13(1).
89 I. Lianos, Observations of Ioannis Lianos, Faculty of Laws, UCL, Quantification of Damages Workshop, Brussels, January 26, 2010, available
at: www.ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/lianos.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018]; Alliance against Intellectual Property Theft,
Response to the Law of Damages Consultation, July 2007.
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5. Alternative Compensatory Remedy
As we have seen so far based on the analysis above, the new Directive has not managed to solve a number
of problems. In the previous section, we made some recommendations that would possibly deal with some
of these issues, primarily the costs and secondarily the quantification of the antitrust harm. However, some
issues still remain unresolved. For this reason, in the further alternative it would be worth exploring
whether a remedywhich is not based on tortious liability but on contractual principles could help contracting
authorities to receive compensation and overcome the problems of proof and evidence discussed so far,
such as the evidence of a causal link and the quantification of antitrust harm. In this section, it is
recommended that a compensatory remedy alternative to standard tort law litigation should be adopted,
based on the experience gained in Germany and the UK.
Liquidated damages clauses
The contracting parties are able to agree upon “liquidated damages” or “lump sum damage” provisions,
meaning “an amount of compensation payable in the event of breach of the contract, or one of its terms”.90
Liquidated damages clauses in public contracts are particularly attractive because as soon as one breach
occurs (in our own case we are particularly interested in any infringement of competition law in the context
of public procurement), the claimant, i.e. public bodies, are free from the expense and burden of proving
their loss and enforce their claims.91
Germany is an illustrative example of an EU Member State where liquidated damages are quite
widespread in standard purchasing terms and conditions and their use is becoming even greater, by
stipulating that in case of a (proven) cartel infringement by the seller, the latter will have to pay a lump
sum damage to the purchaser.92 There are several court judgments in Germany that have ruled on the
validity of liquidated damages clauses.93 All of them awarded the claimed damages to public bodies, such
as municipalities and public transport companies, and they accepted that the liquidated damages clause
is legal and enforceable. In particular, it was held that:
“The amount of the lump sum damage of 15 per cent is not beyond the amount which can usually
be expected in case of a damage caused by a cartel. Therefore the buyer can rely on its purchasing
terms to claim such a damage amount in the first place while the seller then has to prove that there
was actually a lower damage”.94
Despite the attractiveness of liquidated damages clauses, they are still not standard in public contracts.
There are various reasons for this. First and foremost, there is not a consistent application of the concept
in civil and common law countries. As secondary obligations come into play only when the contract is
breached, liquidated damages can easily be challenged in common law jurisdictions like the UK. They
are primarily caught by the “penalty doctrine”, according to which liquidated damages clauses are deemed
90N. Andrews, Contract Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.599.
91Martin Gramsch and Simmons & Simmons elexica, Liquidated Damages in General Purchasing Terms, 2017, available at: www.elexica.com/en
/legal-topics/antitrust-and-merger-control/190617-liquidated-damages-general-purchasing-terms [Accessed 5 September 2018].
92Getting the Deal Through, Germany, An Interview with Thorsten M ger and Alf-Henrik Bischeke, available at: www.gettingthedealthrough.com
/intelligence/24/article/3228/cartels-germany [Accessed 5 September 2018].
93 See, for instance, the judgment of the regional court of Hannover (LG Hannover, Urteil vom 18.12.2017 – 18 O 8/17, Lkw-Kartell Göttingen),
which confirmed the liability in principle of truck manufacturer MAN towards the city of Göttingen for truck purchases made during the operation of
the truck cartel, available at: www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/first-german-trucks-judgement-confirms-manufacturer-liability-in
-principle/ [Accessed 5 September 2018]; see also the judgment of the Thuringian higher regional court in Jena on 22 February 2017, which upheld
an earlier judgment of the regional court of Erfurt of 3 July 2015, according to which a public transport company was in principle entitled to damages.
See also the judgment of the higher regional court of Karlsruhe (Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, 31 July 2013, 6 U 51/12 Kart) as well as the
judgment of the local court of Mannheim (Landgericht [Regional Court] Mannheim 4 May 2012, 7 O 436/11 Kart), available at: www.vbb.com/media
/Insights_Newsletters/CNL_06_17.pdf and www.elexica.com/en/legal-topics/antitrust-and-merger-control/190617-liquidated-damages-general
-purchasing-terms [Accessed 5 September 2018].
94Gramsch and Simmons & Simmons elexica, Liquidated Damages in General Purchasing Terms (2017).
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to be unenforceable penalties if (a) they are extravagant or unconscionable comparing with the likely
damage caused by the breach, (b) they purport to deter a breach of contract and (c) they are not a genuine
pre-estimate of loss.95 The common law on penalty clauses was established a little over 100 years ago. In
2015, the UK Supreme Court indicated some progress in this area of law by considering again the law of
penalties and the validity of penalty clauses. The chance for this reconsideration was given on the occasion
of the conjoined appeals in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi and ParkingEye Ltd v
Beavis.96 It clarified that a clause is not disproportionate to the innocent party’s legitimate interests, despite
its penal nature when it intends to deter a breach of contract and though it may not be representative of
the actual loss that the innocent party sustained, as long as the clause has been the object of negotiations
between contracting parties of comparable bargaining power and it has been scrutinised by their legal
advisers.97 On the other hand, in civil law countries, penalty clauses are allowed, as long as the penalty
amount is not manifestly excessive.98 In these countries, traditionally there used to be no distinction between
liquidated damages and penalty clauses, but following the precedent of the German Civil Code, there is
a distinction between them and they also provide for mitigation of penalty clauses if they are
“disproportionate or excessively high/manifestly excessive”.99
To make things worse, the lack of uniform application of liquidated damages clauses can be found even
in the context of a single EU Member State and jurisdiction. In Germany, for instance, there are several
uncertainties regarding liquidated damages clauses. There is still no consensus regarding the validity of
contractual clauses providing for a lump sum as compensation in case of competition law infringements.
In its judgment on 13 April 2016, the regional court of Potsdam100 held that purchasing terms contemplating
a lump sum amount of damages amounting to 15 per cent of the contract value in all cases, regardless of
the specific type and intensity of the competition law infringement that took place, are too wide in scope
and so they fail to fulfill the standard of damages expected under normal circumstances.101 This judgment
was further appealed to the Federal Supreme Court but the appeal was withdrawn, leaving many questions
unanswered.102
Another reason why liquidated damages clauses are not standard in a public contract is that they limit
the damages to which the claimant is entitled and that the contract enforcement rate is generally low.
Contract lawmatters a lot less than expected, as non-contractual enforcementmechanisms such as reputation
and loss of future revenue can play a really important role for contracting parties.103 This can be explained
by the fact that contracting parties generally avoid courts in order to enforce contractual obligations, for
fear that they will pay a lot of money for legal fees, while in the end the case may not be resolved in their
95Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd (1915) A.C. 70, 86–88.
96 [2015] UKSC 67.
97F. Elliott, The Brand New Law on Liquidated Damages, November 2015, available at:www.fenwickelliott.com/research-insight/newsletters/insight
/53 [Accessed 5 September 2018].
98 S. Hoeve-Ouchan and G. de Rosa, Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses: A Common Law and Civil Law Perspective, July 2013, available
at: www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Company-Commercial/Singapore/VoskampLawyers/Liquidated-damages-and-penalty-clauses-a
-common-law-and-civil-law-perspective# [Accessed 5 September 2018]; J.F. McKenna and Reed Smith LLP, Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses:
A Civil Law versus Common LawComparison - The Critical Path, available at:www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2008/05/the-critical-path [Accessed
5 September 2018].
99The terminology used in order to describe when penalty clauses can be mitigated is different from civil code to civil code. Hoeve-Ouchan and de
Rosa, Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses: A Common Law and Civil Law Perspective (2013); J.F. McKenna and Reed Smith LLP, Liquidated
Damages and Penalty Clauses: A Civil Law versus Common Law Comparison - The Critical Path, 2008.
100LG Potsdam, 1304.2016, Az. 2 O 23/15.
101Global Legal Insights, Germany, Cartels 2017, available at: www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/cartels/global-legal-insights---cartels
-5th-ed./germany [Accessed 5 September 2018]; P. Meyer and M. Gramsch, “The Regional Court of Potsdam finds a clause in the procurement terms
of a Germanmunicipality requiring liquidated damages of 15 per cent to be paid if the supplier participates in anti-competitive behaviour to be unlawful
(Suppliers of fire engines)” e-Competitions Bulletin, Art. No. 77233 (November 2014).
102Meyer and Gramsch, “The Regional Court of Potsdam finds a clause in the procurement terms of a German municipality requiring liquidated
damages of 15 per cent to be paid if the supplier participates in anti-competitive behaviour to be unlawful (Suppliers of fire engines)” (2014), p.2.
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favour, “despite the significant attention paid to drafting, amending and consulting formal contracts”.104
Under these circumstances, “litigation is almost always an empty threat”.105
In addition to the above, as regards public contracts in particular, corruption of the civil servants who
are in charge of the contract as well as the negative effects of litigation on the continuation of the
buyer-supplier relationship may prevent the effective enforcement of contractual remedies, such as
liquidated damages clauses, in the domain of public procurement.106 As HM Treasury characteristically
mentioned in one of its reports about private finance initiatives (“PFIs”)107 “there exists anecdotal evidence
that the public sector can sometimes be reluctant to levy deductions for fear of spoiling the relationship
with the private sector”.108 In Italy, according to third party inspections commissioned by the Italian Public
Procurement Agency (Consip), “in the period 2005-2008 on a total of 4095 inspections a total of 1455
contractual infringements by the contractor were ascertained, but contractual remedies/penalties were only
exercised in 64 of those cases, i.e. against about 4.42 per cent of the infringements”.109
In view of the above, liquidated damages clauses could be a good alternative remedy that would help
contracting authorities to receive compensation and overcome the problems of proof and evidence that
they currently face under the new Damages Directive, as long as there is a uniform approach regarding
the extent of their validity. Otherwise there is always the risk that liquidated damage clauses remain
unapplied and may be rejected by the court.
6. Conclusions
Competitive tender processes in public procurement contribute to greater economic efficiency and
particularly to lower prices for the award of public contracts, saving money for the taxpayer. However,
bid rigging, an anti-competitive activity that is widespread in public procurement markets, may artificially
raise the prices of goods or services procured, placing an unnecessary burden on public finances as well
as on taxpayers that ultimately pay for them. For this reason, the possibility for deceived contracting
authorities to seek damages for the rigged goods or services for which they have overpaid is of great
significance, especially in a time of economic crisis in which attempts are made to reduce public expenditure
and secure budget savings.
Before the new Damages Directive, the major problems that victims of competition law infringements
usually experienced when asking for compensation were the difficulty of access to the evidence that was
necessary for proving a case, the lack of clear rules on the passing-on defence, the calculation of damages
and the rules concerning the costs of a damages action. The Directive sought to overcome these issues by
introducing a number of key provisions. This article investigated whether these key provisions adopted
by the new Damages Directivenew Damages Directive were able to overcome the hurdles that contracting
authorities usually face when seeking damages for bid rigging. The article has demonstrated a number of
respects in which the new Damages Directive has failed to put contracting authorities in a particularly
good position to recover damages for bid rigging. Though the new Damages Directive has several strong
points, such as the harmonisation of evidential presumptions and procedural requirements, the explicit
rule of joint and several liability in the case of multiple tortfeasors as well as a series of provisions that
104G. Hadfield and I. Bozovic, “Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build Informal Relations to Support Innovation” (2016) 5 Wisconsin Law
Review 996, 999.
105Hadfield and Bozovic, “Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build Informal Relations to Support Innovation” (2016) 5Wisconsin Law Review
1000.
106G. Spagnolo, Reputation, Competition and Entry in Procurement (2012) 30(3) International Journal of Industrial Organization 291–296, at 292.
107PFI projects are arrangements where the government department responsible for the delivery of a public service entrusts the delivery to the private
sector under a contract. See more in P. Braun, The Practical Impact of E.U. Public Procurement Law on PFI Procurement Practice in the United
Kingdom, available at: www.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/phdtheses/phd_peter_braun_.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2018].
108HM Treasury “PFI: Strengthening Long-Term Partnerships, March 2006, para.4.63.
109E. Iossa and G. Spagnolo, Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A while Hoping for B (2011), CEPR Discussion Articles No.
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facilitate the evidence of causal link, practically speaking, these steps are not adequate to boost the number
of damage actions initiated by public contracting authorities. This may be done only if attempts are made
to deal with the main reasons why contracting authorities are discouraged from lodging actions for damages
against bid riggers.
After identifying the challenges that arise for public authorities in bringing damages claims for bid
rigging under the new Damages Directive, some recommendations were made to address the problem of
high litigation costs, the concern that the initiation of litigation may spoil the buyer-supplier relationship
and the difficulty in specifying and quantifying the antitrust harm suffered by contracting authorities. This
article has argued that a “Competition Damages Litigation Fund” is needed, which would enable the
collection and saving of money with the aim that the deceived contracting authorities may seek damages
for the rigged goods or services overpaid. The restriction on compensation of the defendant’s fees to the
statutory attorney fees was an extra proposal for curtailing litigation costs. The assignment of public
authorities’ damages claims to a third party that would also have an interest to sue was another suggestion
in order to overcome the fear of bad cooperative relationships with suppliers in future. Finally, the article
argued that the introduction of statutory or pre-established damages, meaning a lump sum calculated on
the basis of pre-determined factors, is a good option for contracting authorities to overcome the difficulty
in specifying and quantifying the financial harm.
In the further alternative, the article investigated whether an alternative remedy to classic tort law
litigation could enable contracting authorities to get compensated more easily in respect of proof and
evidence. The article distinguished liquidated damages clauses as a good alternative based on contractual
principles because public bodies are free from the expense and burden of proving their loss and enforcing
their claims. Nonetheless, until there is a uniform approach regarding their validity, there is always the
risk of remaining unapplied and being rejected by the court.
In view of the above analysis, the development of damages claims brought by public authorities should
be seen as an adjunct to the current state of antitrust enforcement in the EU for the reasons explained in
the introduction of the article. Even if the European legislator put its best foot forward and tried to deal
with several procedural problems in private enforcement, it has been reluctant to carry it through. The
new Damages Directive does not seem to be effective enough for the legal reparation of contracting
authorities as private litigants. Before its enactment, procurement entities were still able to get compensation
by means of private actions under the relevant national tort laws, even in the shadow of the obstacles
identified above. As a result, private enforcement in the domain of public procurement currently operates
in the slow lane and the author believes that until the Commission reviews the new Damages Directive,
submits its report and suggests more amendments that would further encourage public authorities to sue
bidding rings for damages, settlements should probably be preferred in the domain of public procurement.
The solutions given in the section on recommendations, as well as the alternative compensatory remedy
suggested in the article, could be a good starting point for the future changes that need to be made.
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